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Wading in the Sargasso Sea: The Double
Jeopardy Clause, Non-Capital Sentencing
Proceedings, and California's
"Three Strikes" Law Collide
in Monge v. California
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads, in part, "[N]or
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life
or limb."' This passage, known commonly as the Double Jeopardy Clause, has
become infamous in legal circles, not merely for its ideals, but for the questions it
creates concerning those ideals.2
The principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause are woven into the fabric of the
Constitution via the Bill of Rights and corresponding case law, yet this case law
has become troublesome.3 While issues concerning the Clause and a trial on guilt
or innocence are well resolved, many others remain hazy. As one scholar put it,
"[T]he decisional law in the [double jeopardy] area is a veritable Sargasso Sea
which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."4
In particular, sentencing proceedings have been a recent sore spot for judicial
clarity in the double jeopardy realm. Until 1980, many thought this matter had
been resolved by the Supreme Court in United States v. DiFrancesco,5 which held
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not pertain to sentencing proceedings.6
However, one year later the Court opened Pandora's Box by creating an exception
and applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to capital sentencing proceedings.'
While creating such an exception furthered the ideals of the Court, some questions
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 YALE L.J. 1807 (1997)
(addressing the issue of how to define the phrase "same offense" in the Double Jeopardy Clause).
3. See generally Ryan H. Stuart, Penalties and Taxes May Break My Bones, But Forfeitures Will
Never Punish Me: A Critical Examination of the Double Jeopardy Clause After United States v.
Ursery, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1367 (1997).
4. William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411, 412
(1993) (citing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)).
5. 449 U.S. 117(1980).
6. See id. at 13-14 (holding that subsequent to remand, a stricter sentence may be imposed in
criminal proceedings).
7. See generally Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
loomed large. For example, if capital sentencing proceedings were indeed a
context in which an exception to DiFrancesco should apply, where would such
exceptions stop?
Such legal questions are not confined solely to the issues surrounding the
Double Jeopardy Clause. Recidivism statutes have proved equally troublesome to
the Supreme Court. Of course, double jeopardy concerns are intrinsic to such
maxims as "three-strikes" laws. In particular, courts were concerned that three-
strikes laws would, in effect, punish a defendant twice for the same offense.'
Remarkably, the Court did not lay this concern to rest until 1997 in United States
v. Watts,9 ruling that enhancement statutes punish the defendant for his present
crime based on his previous actions, thereby making any double jeopardy concerns
moot.1°
To keep double jeopardy pitfalls at bay, states such as California have
developed safeguards for sentencing proceedings involving three-strikes laws."
These protections include the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses
and evidence, and the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof. 2 While
such safeguards are not mandated by the Constitution per se, they do afford the
utmost protection in an area otherwise littered with legal land mines. 3 Despite the
best efforts of legislators and the courts to clarify the law on sentencing for both
capital and non-capital offenses, conflicts arose that came to a head in Monge v.
California.4 In this case, the Court decided to resolve an issue it had passed on
several times before: whether the Double Jeopardy Clause pertains to non-capital
sentencing proceedings. 5 In deciding that the Clause did not apply, the Court
provided some resolution to the questions raised by Bullington v. Missouri.16 In
doing so, the Court overruled the Bullington rationale that the Double Jeopardy
Clause applies to capital sentencing proceedings because such bear "the hallmarks
of a trial on guilt or innocence."' 7 The Court said in Monge that because such
8. See, e.g., Porter v. Singletary, 883 F. Supp. 660 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (holding that statutes
imposing heavier sentences on habitual criminals add to punishment for future crimes, not to their
punishment for past crimes).
9. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
10. See id. at 151.
11. See infra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
12. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Cal. 1997) aff'd, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998).
13. But see infra notes 195-204 and accompanying text (discussing the problems of applying such
safeguards to non-capital sentencing proceedings).
14. 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
15. Compare State v. Hennings, 670 P.2d 256,261-62 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that Double
Jeopardy Clause barred second habitual criminal proceeding where state had failed to prove validity of
each prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt), andBriggs v. Procunier, 764 F.2d 368, 371 (5th Cir.
1985), with People v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317, 322 (111. 1993) (holding that Double Jeopardy Clause does
not bar a second attempt at enhanced sentencing), and Carpenter v. Chapleau, 72 F.3d 1269, 1274 (6th
Cir. 1996).
16. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
17. See id. at 439.
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sentencing proceedings do not have the constitutionally mandated protections that
capital sentencings do, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not apply. 8 The Court
noted that proceedings involving capital punishment are so unlike any other type
of proceeding that the exception created for capital sentencing proceedings in
Bullington can be successfully attenuated from all other sentencing proceedings. 9
Yet, recidivism statutes, and California's three-strikes law in particular, are unique
in and of themselves. By identifying an issue as broad as the application of the
Double Jeopardy Clause to non-capital sentencing proceedings, the Court has left
one very important question unanswered: where sentencing and recidivism statutes
meet, is there any room left for the Double Jeopardy Clause?
This Note is divided into six parts. Part II will analyze the historical
background of the Double Jeopardy Clause and three-strikes statutes. Part III will
examine the factual and procedural background of Monge. Part IV will discuss the
majority and dissenting opinions of the Court. Part V will include an analysis of
the Monge decision and a discussion of its future impact. Finally, Part VI will
contain a brief conclusion.
I. HISTORY
A. The Double Jeopardy Clause
The common law of the United States provides most of the legal protections
against double jeopardy.2 ° These protections are so vast that the details of the law's
component parts have been described as "numbingly complex."'" Despite such
decisions as State v. Felch,22 which trace the history of double jeopardy back to
English statutes prior to 179 1,23 the legislative history of double jeopardy is quite
recent.24 However, even though the legislative history is comparatively brief, the
idea of double jeopardy is much older.25
"The early development of [double jeopardy] can be traced through a variety
of sources ranging from legal maxims to casual references in contemporary
commentary."26 There is evidence of prohibitions against different forms of double
18. See id.
19. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
20. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 413-14.
21. See id.
22. 105 A. 23, 26 (Vt. 1918).
23. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 413-14.
24. See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
25. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 339 (1975).
26. Id.
jeopardy in such places as early Roman and canon law.27 In addition, a very early
form of double jeopardy protection emerged as early as the Fourteenth Century.2"
By the 1600's, double jeopardy protections, then crystallized to some extent, were
enumerated in four distinct pleas: autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, autrefois
attaint, and former pardon.29 These common-law rules were disseminated, as
evidence of them has been found in two popular publications of the time:
Blackstone's Commentaries" and Coke's Institutes."
The first evidence of rules prohibiting double jeopardy appeared in America
for the first time in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641.32 This piece of
colonial legislation not only served as a model for other colonies, but also
expanded the scope of protection afforded by English common law. 3 Yet the
culmination of double jeopardy law in America would not come until its
incorporation into the Bill.of Rights.34
The Double Jeopardy Clause was originally proposed by James Madison in
1789."5 It was later augmented with language incorporated from Blackstone, and
was unanimously passed by Congress.36 At the time, only two states had similar
protections in their respective state constitutions.37 Interestingly, the Double
Jeopardy Clause was not deemed applicable to the states until the 1969 Supreme
Court decision of Benton v. Maryland,3" in which the Court held the Clause to be
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice."39
The three original protections afforded by English common law were only
recently Americanized. Both North Carolina v. Pearce4 ° and United States v.
DiFrancesco4t acknowledged three separate protections afforded by the Double
Jeopardy Clause: protection from a second prosecution after acquittal, protection
27. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 414.
28. See id.; see also Wilson, 420 U.S. at 339-40 n.6 (referencing early forms of double jeopardy
protections in the time of the Year Books and Fifteenth century English courts).
29. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 414.
30. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 414 (citing William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England 335-37 (13th ed. 1880)).
31. See id. (citing Edward Coke, The Third Party of the Institutes of the Laws of England 213-14
(1648)).
32. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 415.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 415-18.
35. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 341 (1975). Madison's proposed incorporation of
double jeopardy protection into the Bill of Rights read, "[n]o person shall be subject, except in cases
of impeachment, to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense." See id.
36. See id. at 341-42.
37. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 415. New Hampshire's constitution provided limited protection
for prior acquittals. See id. Pennsylvania used language similar to the language incorporated into the
Fifth Amendment. See id.
38. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
39. See id. at 794-95 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
40. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
41. 449U.S. 117(1980).
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from a second prosecution after conviction, and protection from multiple
punishments for the same offense.42 In this sense, the modem Double Jeopardy
Clause provides much broader protections than in England or the colonies, as it is
not limited to capital felonies, previous convictions, or prior acquittals. The
rationale for this broad approach is simple,
[T]he State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though
innocent he may be found guilty.43
This broad approach has been significantly narrowed in recent years." Even
so, exceptions to the rule have only been grudgingly allowed.45 These exceptions
are quite numerous, however, and they cover a wide range of time, cases, and
issues involving the Double Jeopardy Clause and the protections it affords citizens
of the United States.46
B. Sentencing Procedures in the Double Jeopardy Context
Cases determining the range of the Double Jeopardy Clause when applied to
sentencing restrictions answer the unresolved issues that culminated in the Monge
decision.47 North Carolina v. Pearce4" established that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not prevent a defendant convicted on retrial following the reversal of his
original conviction to have a more severe sentence imposed on him than his
original sentence.49 This notion was further expanded by the landmark case of
42. See id. at 129 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
43. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).
44. See id.
45. See Emily Ann Johnson, et al., Twenty Seventh Annual Review ofCriminal Procedure, 86 GEO.
L.J. 1550, 1585-92 (1998).
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
49. See id. at 718-19; see also Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer, 474 U.S. 28,30 (1985) (holding that
the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar re-sentencing on counts for which sentence is suspended);
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 155-56 (1986) (Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar reimposition
of the death penalty at a second sentencing proceeding, even though the second sentence was
particularly based on an aggravating circumstance not found at the original sentencing); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause's bar to imposition of the death
penalty applies only to cases in which there is an implied acquittal); Witte v. United States, 115 S. Ct.
2199 (1995) (holding that consideration of uncharged relevant conduct in determining a defendant's
sentence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines does not constitute punishment for that conduct).
United States v. DiFrancesco,5 ° which firmly established the legal maxim that the
Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent the government from appealing a
sentence, nor does it prevent the appellate court from increasing the sentence. 1
Although the law seemed clear on this issue, problems arose in capital punishment
cases. In Bullington v. Missouri,5 2 the Court determined that capital punishment
was such an extreme penalty that exceptions would have to be made to the rule
established in DiFrancesco." In particular, the Bullington Court ruled that the
government cannot seek the death penalty after reconviction of a capital offense
where the defendant was not given the death penalty in his first sentencing
proceeding.'
C. Three Strikes Laws
The history of three-strikes laws, while a separate and unique topic, has
extreme relevance to the case at bar. Habitual offender laws have been in existence
since Sixteenth Century England and colonial America." These laws had two
separate thrusts. The first was to target offenders who specialized in a particular
type of crime;5 6 the second was to punish offenders who committed such crimes a
specific number of times. 7 By the Eighteenth Century, these laws encompassed
a wider variety of offenses as the specialization of crimes was slowly phased out.5"
By 1797, New York became the first state government in the United States to enact
this broader type of statute.
59
Although this new type of legislation was quickly developing a foothold in the
United States, habitual offender legislation did not completely avail itself to this
country until the 1920's.' One typical example of the legislation of this period was
Baume's Law, a New York statute enacted in 1926.61 Baume's Law was the
predecessor of modem three-strikes legislation, as it provided life in prison for
third-time felony offenders.62 Many states followed New York's lead in enacting
this type of statute, and by 1968, twenty-three states had laws mandating life
imprisonment after a specified number of offenses were committed by a single
50. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
51. See id. at 134-35.
52. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
53. See McAninch, supra note 4, at 415.
54. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981).
55. See Brandon K. Applegate, et al., "Three Strikes and You're Out" Legislation: A National
Assessment, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1995, at 17.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
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The 1970's were an important decade for recidivism laws, as legislators were
engaged in the political battle to try to "out-tough" one another.' Accordingly,
lawmakers took several steps toward this end. The first of these was the return of
capital punishment as a constitutionally viable form legal reprimand.65 In addition,
legislators across the country promulgated the enactment of not only habitual
offender laws, but mandatory sentencing restrictions as well.66 One prime example
of the trends of this time was in Texas, where third-time felons automatically
received twenty-five years to life in prison.6" The trends developed in the 1970's
continued into the 1980's, and by 1982, a vast majority of states had criminal
statutes on the books that singled out repeat offenders for "particularly harsh
punishment.
'68
1993 proved to be a watershed year for three-strikes legislation, as it then came
to be known. These types of laws were promulgated by media events of the year
including the Polly Klaas killing and the murder of James Jordan, father of
basketball star Michael Jordan.69 In both instances, these crimes were committed
by people with prior felony convictions. 0 By November of that year, both state
and federal legislators took decisive action in response to the election victories of
many candidates that ran on "get-tough-on-crime" platforms.7 Accordingly, the
State of Washington adopted the United States' first official three-strikes
proposal.72 This trend was picked up by a majority of states, and California quickly
followed suit in early 1994.7
The three-strikes legislation proposed in California proved to be stricter than
the Washington model.74 In particular, it limited time off given to repeat offenders
for good behavior.75 It also required convicts to serve at least eighty percent of
their sentence in jail, as opposed to the fifty percent requirement mandated in
63. See id.
64. See id. at 16.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Meredith McClain, "Three Strikes and You're Out": The Solution to the Repeat Offender
Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 101 (1996).
68. See Selective Incapacitation: Reducing Crime Through Predictions of Recidivism, 96 HARv.
L. REV. 511, 511 (1982).
69. See Applegate, supra note 55, at 16.
70. See id.
71. See Marc Mauer, Politics, Crime Control ... and Baseball?, 9 CRIM. JUST., Fall 1994, at 30.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See McClain, supra note 67, at 104; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12, & 1192.7
(West 1982, 1999 & Supp. 1999).
75. See McClain, supra note 67, at 104.
867
Washington.76 Although some viewed these changes as a harsh stance by the state,
the bill passed in March 1994.7 An identical initiative was passed by voters at the
ballot box eight months later, thereby quashing any opposition the legislation might
have had." The intent of the laws was "to ensure longer prison sentences.., for
those who commit a felony and have been previously convicted of serious and/or
violent felony offenses."79 Shortly after the California bill became law, a federal
three-strikes bill was signed into law by President Clinton, and the remaining
holdout states stepped in line shortly thereafter.' As of today, all fifty states have
enacted some form of recidivism statute.8'
111. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY
The facts of Monge v. California82 are straightforward. On January 25, 1995,
two undercover officers were investigating marijuana distribution in Pomona,
California." At one point during the day, after their inquiries to a thirteen-year-old
boy, the officers observed the boy approach the defendant, Angel James Monge,
and have a short conversation with him." The officers then observed Monge hand
the boy several plastic baggies8 Shortly thereafter, the boy approached the
officers and offered to sell them two dime bags of marijuana.86 Monge and the boy
were subsequently arrested. 7
Monge was charged with several offenses, including using a minor to sell
marijuana, the sale or transportation of marijuana, and the possession of marijuana
for sale. 8 The district attorney also alleged that Monge had a prior serious felony
conviction under California's three strikes law; namely Monge's July 1992
conviction for assault with a deadly weapon. 9 In the present case, Monge pled not
guilty to all accusations and motioned to bifurcate the trial on the guilt and
sentencing phases, which was granted by the court.' A jury subsequently found
Monge guilty of the substantive charges against him.9
76. See id.
77. See Steven Pressman & Jennifer Kaae, Three Strikes: The Law Was Intended to Send a Clear
Message to Repeat Criminals. But no one Agrees What That Message Is, 16 CALIFORNIA LAW, OCt.
1996, at 33.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 34.
80. See Mauer, supra note 71, at 30.
81. See id.
82. 118 S. Ct. 2246 (1998).
83. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1997) aff'd 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11359-61 (West 1991).
89. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1124.
90. See id.
91. See id.
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In the sentencing phase of the trial, the government asserted that Monge's prior
conviction was a "serious felony" under California's three-strikes law.9" However,
the only evidence presented by the prosecutor was that Monge pled guilty and
served time for assault with a deadly weapon.93 These events, the government
asserted, proved an admission that the defendant personally used a deadly weapon
in his prior offense.' The personal use of a deadly weapon is enumerated in
California law as being one of the aforementioned dangerous felonies.9" In spite
of these arguments, the judge sentenced Monge to eleven years in prison-the five
year sentence for the substantive offense was doubled to ten under the three-strikes
law, and an additional one year enhancement for his prior prison term was added."
On appeal to the California Court of Appeals, the court found that the evidence
presented by the government was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had acted personally.97 The court also ruled constitutional
protections against double jeopardy bar the retrial of prior serious felony
allegations, and the case was remanded for sentencing.98 Accordingly, this decision
was appealed by the government to the California Supreme Court.
In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the California Supreme
Court emphasized its well-established hesitation to apply the Double Jeopardy
Clause to sentencing proceedings.99 The court ruled that the rationale employed by
the Supreme Court in Bullington v. Missouri"n) did not apply to the case at bar. The
court noted Bullington was confined to the specifics of capital cases."'1 The court
further ruled that while capital sentencing procedures such as the right to confront
witnesses and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard were mandated by the
Court's interpretation of the Constitution, such procedural protections in Califor-
nia's sentence enhancement proceedings rest on statutory grounds and are therefore
immune to the Double Jeopardy restrictions imposed in capital cases."°2 The court
also distinguished the sentencing proceedings at bar from capital proceedings by
emphasizing the "breadth and subjectivity of factual determinations at issue in the
capital sentencing context, as well as the financial and emotional burden of the
92. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 192.7(c)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
93. See People v. Monge, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2249 (1998).
94. See id.
95. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(1).
96. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2249.
97. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Cal. 1997) affd, 118 S.Ct. 2246 (1998).
98. See id.
99. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2249.
100. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
101. SeeMonge, 118 S. Ct. at 2249.
102. See id.
capital sentencing phase."' 3  Finally, the majority pointed out that while a
qualifying strike under California's three-strikes law involves the finding of a
particular status that may be made from the defendant's criminal record, capital
sentencing "'depends on specific facts of the defendant's present crime, as well as
an overall assessment of the defendant's character.""' 4
The dissent analyzed the Bullington decision in a much broader context.
While acknowledging the legitimacy of the differences pointed out by the majority,
the dissent interpreted the Bullington rationale as applying to successive efforts to
prove prior conviction allegations due to evidentiary insufficiency in any
sentencing context, not just capital proceedings. 5 This discrepancy, which had
been reinforced by a number of state and federal court decisions, provided a basis
of appeal for Monge."3° On January 16, 1998, the Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari.0 7 The issue to be decided was limited to the following question,
"Does the Double Jeopardy Clause apply to noncapital sentencing proceedings that
have the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence?"'0 8
IV. MAJORITY AND DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion
In her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor first outlined California's three-
strikes law and emphasized certain distinct aspects of the statute."° First, she noted
the portion of the law applicable to the case at bar: when an instant conviction is
proceeded by one serious felony offense, the court is required to double the
defendant's term of imprisonment."0 Next, Justice O'Connor summarized the
law's definition of a "serious felony" as it applied to Monge. She noted that "[a]n
assault conviction qualifies as a serious felony if the defendant either inflicts great
bodily injury on another or personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon during
the assault.' Finally, Justice O'Connor emphasized the procedural safeguards
for three strikes sentencing proceedings as mandated by California law. These
include the defendant's right to a jury trial, right to confront witnesses, and
privilege against self-incrimination." 2 The government has restrictions imposed
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1130).
105. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
106. See supra note 15.
107. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 751.
108. See id.
109. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2246 (Justice O'Connor was joined in her opinion by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Thomas and Breyer).
110. See id.
111. See id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(8) & (23) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
112. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2248.
870
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on it as well. According to California law, the State must prove the allegations
beyond a reasonable doubt and it must obey all the ordinary rules of evidence." 3
Next, Justice O'Connor quickly delved into the procedural history of Monge v.
California. She stated that when the case was brought before the California Court
of Appeal, prosecutors conceded that the sentencing allegations against Monge
were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.' " When the State asked for an
opportunity to prove the allegations on remand, the Court of Appeal ruled that
doing so would violate double jeopardy principles.'
In examining the California Supreme Court reversal of the Court of Appeal,
Justice O'Connor noted the United States Supreme Court's "traditional reluctance"
to apply double jeopardy concerns to sentencing proceedings, and concluded that
the exception to this rule, created in Bullington v. Missouri,"6 would not apply in
this case." 7 Justice O'Connor pointed out five reasons for the majority's
holding." 8 First, the Court's statements in cases such as Caspari v. Bohlen"9 and
Pennsylvania v. Goldhammer2 ° specifically confine Bullington to capital cases. ''
The second reason was the different foundations for sentencing procedures in
capital and non-capital cases; "capital sentencing procedures are mandated by the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Constitution, whereas the procedural
safeguards accorded in California's sentence enhancement proceedings rest on
statutory grounds."' Third, the factual determinations in capital sentencing
proceedings are different in terms of breadth and subjectivity. 2 3 The Court's
fourth basis for its decision was the greater financial and emotional burden placed
on defendants in a capital sentencing that in a non-capital proceeding. 24 Finally,
a qualifying strike under a three-strikes statute involves the finding of a particular
status that must be made from the record of the defendant's prior convictions. 2
However, a capital sentencing determination must be broader.'26 Federal law
mandates that such a proceeding take into account "the specific facts of the
113. See id.
114. See id. at 2249.
115. See id.
116. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. 510 U.S. 383 (1994).
120. 474 U.S. 28 (1985).
121. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. at 2249.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
defendant's present crime, as well as an overall assessment of the defendant's
character."' 27 Justice O'Connor ended this discussion by briefly summarizing the
Court's three-judge dissent, which reasoned that under the Bullington rationale that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes successive efforts to prove prior conviction
allegations."'28
Next, Justice O'Connor examined the related three-strikes and double jeopardy
case law. In North Carolina v. Pearce, '29 the Court ruled that the Double Jeopardy
Clause "protects against successive prosecutions for the same offense after
acquittal or conviction, as well as multiple prosecutions for the same offense."'3 °
This was followed by Bullington v. Missouri, 3' which held the Double Jeopardy
Clause to be "inapplicable to sentencing proceedings."' 32 Justice O'Connor also
noted Nichols v. United States,'3 3 which held that the determinations at issue in
sentencing proceedings do not place the defendant in double jeopardy for an
"offense."' 34 This was followed in 1997 by the Court's decision in United States
v. Watts, 3 which held that sentence enhancements are not construed as additional
punishment for the previous offense.'36 To clarify this holding, Justice O'Connor
referred to Gryger v. Burke.'37 Gryger held that an enhanced sentence is only "'a
stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated
offense because [sic] a repetitive one. '"'138
Although the case law on recidivism statutes and the Double Jeopardy Clause
seem fairly straightforward, Justice O'Connor addressed the argument that a prior-
felony enhancement could be interpreted as an element of the present offense,
thereby precluding such legal pitfalls as a double jeopardy violation.'39 Justice
O'Connor stated that this issue was resolved in Almendarez-Torres v. United
States, 40 where the Court rejected "an absolute rule that an enhancement
constitutes an element of the offense any time it increases the maximum sentence
to which a defendant is exposed.'' 4 However, Justice O'Connor conceded that
some cases may exist in which fundamental ideals of fairness would require the
definition of a fact of the substantive case as a sentencing factor.'42 For example,
127. See id.
128. See id. at 2249-50.
129. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
130. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250.
131. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
132. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250.
133. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
134. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250.
135. 519 U.S. 148 (1997).
136. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250.
137. 334 U.S. 728 (1948).
138. Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250 (quoting Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948)).
139. See id.
140. 118 U.S. 1219 (1998).
141. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2250-51.
142. See id. at 2250.
872
[Vol. 27: 861, 2000] Wading in the Sargasso Sea
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
a defendant would not want to plead innocent to drug charges and dispute the
amount of drugs allegedly involved, should a certain amount trigger such
sentencing enhancements as the ones that have been previously defined.'43
Justice O'Connor further bolstered the majority's holding by eliminating the
notion that a sentencing decision favorable to the defendant constitutes an implied
acquittal. Justice O'Connor first pointed out Burks v. United States, " in which the
Court did, in fact, rule that an appellate court's overturning of a conviction due to
insufficient evidence, was equivalent to an acquittal and that the Double Jeopardy
Clause would prevent the case from being retried.'45 However, in terms of
sentencing, Justice O'Connor dismissed and referred to United States v.
DiFrancesco.'46 In that case, the Court held that when a failure of proof occurs at
the sentencing stage, such a finding does not constitute an acquittal because it does
not have "the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.'' 47
The majority's next step in its decision was to further distinguish the
Bullington exception from the case at bar. First, O'Connor wrote that Bullington
created a narrow exception to the general rule that the Double Jeopardy Clause
does not apply to sentencing proceedings.' 48 Key to this finding was the reasoning
used by the Court in the Bullington case. First, and perhaps most important, the
Court noted that a jury's deliberations in a capital sentencing proceeding bear the
"hallmarks of the trial on guilt or innocence."' 49 Tantamount to this statement is
the fact that such a jury has only two options: death or life in prison. In addition,
all evidence is required to be introduced in a separate proceeding that formally
resembles a trial. 5 ' The jury in such a trial is given standards to guide their
decision, and the prosecution is required to establish certain facts beyond a
reasonable doubt.'
51
For all these reasons,. capital sentencings are different than traditional
sentencing proceedings because it is impossible to conclude in a traditional context
that the imposition of a less severe sentence indicates that the government failed
to prove its case.'52 Justice O'Connor went on to note that capital sentencing
143. See id.
144. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
145. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251.
146. 449 U.S. 117 (1980).
147. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251 (quoting United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134
(1980)).
148. See id.
149. See id. (quoting Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981)).
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
proceedings are unique in terms of embarrassment, expense, and ordeal." 3 The
Supreme Court on several occasions has explained that not only is there more
anxiety and insecurity involved for defendants in such proceedings, but there is
also an unacceptably high risk that failure to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to
capital sentencing proceedings would incur an extremely high risk of error in
imposing the death penalty.'54
The next part of the majority opinion concentrated on the petitioner's
arguments. In particular, Justice O'Connor focused in on Monge's argument that
California's sentencing scheme bears the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or
innocence.'55 This was part of the Court's rationale in Bullington and was the main
basis for Monge's contention that the same exception should be applied to the case
at bar. To illustrate, the petitioner noted that in three-strike sentencing proceedings
in California, the sentencer makes an objective finding as to whether or not the
government has proven certain historical facts beyond a reasonable doubt, much
in the same way capital sentence proceedings are handled.'56 However, Justice
O'Connor provided several distinguishing characteristics in her opinion.
First, Justice O'Connor stated that the penalty phase of a capital trial is not a
separate and distinct part of capital proceedings, but is actually a continuation of
the trial on guilt or innocence and therefore subject to double jeopardy
preclusions.'57 In addition, the death penalty is unique in its "'severity and
finality."" 5  As such, there is an extremely important desire for reliability in
capital sentencing proceedings which simply does not exist in other types of
sentencings. 5 9 As Justice O'Connor noted, "'[w]e have consistently required that
capital proceedings be policed at all stages by an especially vigilant concern for
procedural fairness and for the accuracy of factfinding. '' 6° All of these lines of
reasoning reinforced the majority's belief that capital sentencing proceedings, and
the double jeopardy protections afforded them, be attenuated from all other types
of sentencings, including those involved in California's three-strikes legislation.
In summary, Justice O'Connor distinguished the Court's decision in Bullington in
three ways: 1) it is confined to capital cases; 2) it is an example of the heightened
procedural protections accorded capital defendants; and 3) its holding turns on the
trial-like proceedings at issue and the severity of the penalty at stake. 6'
In conclusion, Justice O'Connor underlined the foundation for the majority's
opinion; constitutional restrictions and the death penalty. Justice O'Connor noted
that in capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
153. See id.
154. See id. at 2251-52.
155. See id. at 2252-53.
156. See id. at 2252.
157. See id.
158. See id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977)).
159. See id.
160. Id. (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 704 (1984)).
161. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2252.
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Amendment has several requirements. 162 Among these are the "'consideration of
the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the
particular offense [involved].'163 However, the trial-like protections in non-capital
sentencing proceedings, such as is the case with California's three-strikes law, are
matter of "legislative grace, not constitutional command."'" Therefore, Justice
O'Connor and the majority ruled that there is no requirement for the Court to
extend the double jeopardy bar to non-capital sentencing proceedings.16
B. Dissenting Opinions
Justice Stevens' dissent took an expected departure from the line of focus
taken by Justice O'Connor. Justice Stevens viewed the Double Jeopardy Clause
in terms of evidentiary insufficiency at any point of a legal proceeding.1 66 As such,
he cited Burks v. United States167 in holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a second bite at the apple. 68 In doing so, Stevens made a distinction
between legal errors, for which the Double Jeopardy Clause would not apply, and
a lack of evidence. 169 He noted that by doing so, he was correcting a problem long
overlooked by the Supreme Court in previous rulings and again in the case at bar.170
One important aspect of Justice Stevens' dissent was his handling of the issue of
procedural safeguards. Although such safeguards are not constitutionally
mandated as a part of California's three strikes law, as the majority pointed out,
Justice Stevens argued that such prophylactic measures were created in response
to a "traditional understanding of fundamental fairness.'' It is this idea of
fairness, that provides the basis for the Double Jeopardy Clause itself.'72 Justice
Stevens argued that it is this commonality in foundations that provides a link
between the two and calls for the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to
such laws.'73
Justice Scalia took quite a different approach in his dissent. Although he
162. See id. at 2253.
163. Id. (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)).
164. See id.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 2253-54 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
167. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
168. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2254 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (citing Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 17 (1978)).
169. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. See id. at 2255 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. See id. at 2254-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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agreed with Justice Stevens' interpretation of double jeopardy law, he argued that
the main issue at question was whether or not the proceeding in question in Monge
was part of the sentencing procedures as they have been described, or if it was
tantamount to a ruling on a portion of the substantive offense.'74 In his opinion, he
noted, "[tihe fundamental distinction between facts that are elements of a criminal
offense and facts that go only to the sentence provides the foundation for our entire
Double Jeopardy jurisprudence."''
As Justice Scalia explained, the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy
Clause have been held applicable to proceedings involving substantive offenses,
not sentencings. 6 That being established, Justice Scalia noted that such labels,
while helpful in some aspects, are merely categorizations affixed by legislatures
and should not be used to determine constitutional jurisprudence.'77 In a
hypothetical addressing the deficiency, Justice Scalia created a jurisdiction that
contains only one criminal offense: "knowingly caus[ing] injury to another."'78
This offense is subject to a number of sentencing enhancements based on
additional factors such as use of a deadly weapon or the intent to kill.'79 The
Double Jeopardy Clausejurisprudence forwarded by the majority creates a serious
problem. With these enhancements labeled as a part of the sentencing phase, a
prosecutor has unlimited opportunities to convict someone of any crime with a
wide variety of sentencing consequences. 8 ° In short, Monge has created vast
problems with double jeopardy law that are completely contrary to the legislative
intent of the rule."'
While this hypothetical situation has not yet arisen, Justice Scalia argued that
Monge has done nothing but facilitate such a process.'82 The enhancements
described in the text of the three-strikes statute are the legal equivalent of separate
crimes that expose a defendant to additional punishment.'83 At worst, Justice
Scalia argued, the Court has developed a loophole through which rights guaranteed
by the Constitution can be conveniently circumvented."l Furthermore, such a
ruling removes the incentive for maintaining the sentencing protections mentioned
above."85 To conclude, Justice Scalia labeled the Court's decision making "a grave
constitutional error affecting the most fundamental of rights."'86
174. See id. at 2255 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (Justice Scalia was joined in his dissent by Justices Souter
and Ginsburg).
175. id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
176. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
177. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
178. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
179. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
180. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
181. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
182. See id. at 2256 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
183. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
184. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
185. See id. (Scalia, J. dissenting).
186. Id. at 2257.
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V. ANALYSIS AND IMPACT
A. The Courts and the Creation of a New Exception?
In Monge, Justice O'Connor "narrowed" the scope of her opinion to the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to non-capital sentencing
proceedings." 7 However, Justice O'Connor's scope was too broad. While many
of the Justices' distinctions between capital and non-capital sentencing proceedings
are solid in their foundations, the three-strikes law in Monge sets itself apart from
standard methods of sentencing and therefore creates a litany of legal land mines
that must be separated in a further dissection of double jeopardy law.'88 Failing to
distinguish between subsets of non-capital sentencing proceedings creates a
standard that may thwart the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of many
repeat offenders until the Court follows its own lead in Bullington and carves out
another exception in double jeopardy case law.'89
At the heart of Justice O'Connor's opinion is the adoption of the "like-a-trial"
rationale proposed by the court in Bullington.'9 In essence, the majority enabled
that rationale to evolve into a multiple-part test. 9' The Court used a certain set of
criteria to determine whether a proceeding is sufficiently like a trial to invoke the
187. See id. at 2248.
188. These sentencing standards were formed in response to the disparity among sentences received
by offenders who had committed the same crime. As such, the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 was
passed and resulted in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. See Daniel J. Lyons, Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: Retaining the Preponderance Standard of Proof, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 639, 639-40
(1993). Differences abound in the standards created in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
California's three strikes law. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (West 1994) (allowing for departure from
the sentencing guidelines if a case presents aggravating or mitigating circumstances), with CAL. PENAL
CODE § 667 (West 1999) (mandating specific action of the court for the sentencing of prior serious
felons).
189. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 438 (1981) (holding that cases involving the death
penalty are a separate and distinct subset of sentencing proceedings in the double jeopardy context).
This Note advocates the creation of a similar subset for three strike proceedings. Doing so would
protect the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of repeat offenders much in the same way the
Bullington exception has done for capital defendants. See, e.g., Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203
(1984); People v. Cole, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 221 (Ct. App. 1997) superceded by 942 P.2d 413 (Cal. 1997).
190. See Bullington, 451 U.S. at 439.
191. This "like-a-trial" test has been summarized before. See, e.g., People v. Levin, 157 111. 2d 138,
147-48 (1993); Carpenter v. Chapleau, 72 F.3d 1269, 1273-74 (6th Cir. 1996).
protections of the Double Jeopardy Clause.'92 Thus, in the majority's view, if
attributes such as a limited set of options as to a final decision, delineated standards
to guide the making of that decision, and the beyond a reasonable doubt proof
standard are present, and there are enough of them, there will be no repeat attempts
by the state to relitigate the sentencing phase of a three-strikes proceeding. 3
The individualized nature of non-capital sentence proceedings makes it
virtually impossible to maintain any type of consistency in the results of such a
test.194  Some sentences are imposed by a judge, others by a jury.'95  Some
sentences are imposed at the discretion of ajudge with statutory restrictions, others
specifically mandated, and yet others constrained by such formulas as those
adopted by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 6 Of course, the application of
such a "like-a-trial" test on a case-by-case basis would prove to be impractical at
best. Not only would judicial economy be severely impeded by the number of
litigants who would choose to appeal their cases based on double jeopardy law, 97
but establishing such a rigid test would undoubtedly spawn yet another cacophony
of inconsistent double jeopardy law among the varying jurisdictions, thus creating
even more problems than those the Court has seemingly dispensed with in Monge
v. California."9
The ramifications of these implications are not lost on Justice O'Connor, who
192. While the test may be at the heart of the Court's decision, Justice O'Connor's trump card in
refusing to apply the distinction to Monge is the unique nature and severity of the death penalty. See
Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2251-53.
193. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1127-29, (illustrating an application of these factors to capital
and non-capital cases).
194. Difficulties arise when bright-line rules are applied to any type of proceeding. See Joseph L.
Hoffmann, On the Perils of Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229,
267 (1989); see also Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of
Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1137-63 (1990) (highlighting the difficulties in applying bright line
disproportionality rules in capital cases).
195. See Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 3-4 (1994) ("In the archetypical
Anglo-American criminal justice system, the judge determines the sentence, even in a jury trial. Yet
there are important exceptions.").
196. See generally, Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discretion, Substantial Assistance, and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105 (1994) (illustrating the various methods by
which a court may impose sentence and allow judicial discretion).
197. The right to appeal is the most important right a convicted criminal possesses. See Susan R.
Monkmeyer, The Decision to Appeal a Criminal Conviction: Bridging the Gap Between the
Obligations of Trial and Appellate Counsel, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 399,399-400 (1986). The importance
of the appellate process has not been lost on state legislatures either. See Gregory M. Dyer and Brendan
Judge, Criminal Defendants' Waiver of the Right to Appeal-an Unacceptable Condition of a
Negotiated Sentence or Plea Bargain, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 649, 655 (1990).
198. 118 S. Ct. 2249 (1998). See generally, George C. Thomas II, Don Quixote, the Sargasso Sea,
and the Gordian Knot, 62 WASH. U.L.Q. 79 (1984) (discussing the pitfalls of double jeopardy case law
and its surrounding areas of confusion).
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established Monge's bright-line rule. 199 By refusing to delve into such hypothetical
anomalies in non-capital sentencing, the Court clarified what it could of the
Sargasso Sea of double jeopardy law.2° Yet with this clarification comes the loss
of some flexibility that may be vital to a proper interpretation of any constitutional
issue.2 ' Indeed, an application of the implied test of Bullington to the case at bar
provides interesting results.
The test itself, while not specifically spelled out by Justice O'Connor, has been
used on the state and federal levels.2°' In a number of cases, both state and federal
courts have acknowledged that while a basis exists for holding the Double
Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to sentencing proceedings in general, there are three
steps that any proceeding may overcome in order to be classified as a Bullington
exception. 2°3
(1) [T]he discretion of the jury [must be] restricted to only two options... (2) the
jury [must make] its decision guided by substantive standards and based on evidence
introduced in a formal, separate proceeding that resembles a trial; and (3) the
[government must have] had to prove certain statutorily defined facts beyond a
reasonable doubt .... 204
It is in the application of this test that the uniqueness of the structure of Califor-
nia's three strikes law becomes so readily apparent.20 5
In Williams v. New York, 2°6 the Supreme Court established that a bifurcated
199. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. at 2253 (1998) ("[Ihe Double Jeopardy Clause does not
preclude retrial on a prior conviction allegation in the noncapital sentencing context.").
200. See id. at 2250 (citing contrary results in the application of the Court's decision to hypothetical
situations proposed in response to those forwarded by Justice Scalia in dissent).
201. See Alan Ides, The Curious Case of the Virginia Military Institute: An Essay on the Judicial
Function, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35, 39 (1993) ("Much of the language of the Constitution is stated
in generalities, and the ideas animating that language bespeak fluidity and invite accommodation. All
branches and levels of government interpret and give meaning to that language and those ideas.
Interpretation necessarily means change.").
202. See supra note 191.
203. See id.
204. Carpenter v. Chapleau, 72 F.3d 1269, 1273 (6th Cir. 1996).
205. The proceeding in Monge passes this test with flying colors. The Court is limited to two
options: the original sentence or the enhanced one. Determination of the prior felony is held in a
separate hearing, and such a prior felony must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v.
Monge, 941 P.2d at 1125-27 (1997), cert. granted in part by Monge v. California., 118 S. Ct. 751
(1998), and aff'd [supp.J by Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2246 (1998). See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025
(West 1996) ("[T]he question of whether or not the defendant has suffered the prior conviction shall
be tried by the jury .. "). This reinforces the idea that California's three strikes law is a subset of non-
capital sentence proceedings worthy of the Bullington exception. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at
1125-27.
206. 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
sentencing proceeding, as the one afforded to Monge under California law, is not
required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in non-capital
cases.2"7 Therefore, since such a proceeding is not constitutionally mandated, any
state that voluntarily elects to provide such a trial of the sentencing allegations can
do so with only a minimal amount of due process protections and without any
double jeopardy protections.2 °8 However, a state may choose to invoke whatever
additional safeguards it deems necessary.2" In three-strikes cases, California has
elected to provide several protections in its now mandatory jury trials of prior
conviction allegations.2" ° It is these protections that set California's three-strikes
law apart, for only then does it rise to the level of a Bullington exception.
The Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant in applying the Double
Jeopardy Clause to any type of sentencing proceeding.2 ' Yet, thanks to the
Bullington exception, such an application is not without precedent.2" In her
opinion, Justice O'Connor endorsed several distinguishing features the California
Supreme Court used to differentiate between capital punishment and three strikes
207. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1125. The Court in Williams held that lesser procedural
protections were needed to allow Judges to exercise discretion in sentencing. However, with the current
rigid guidelines restricting such judicial discretion, such a lessening is not relevant to the modern state
of the law. See The Supreme Court, 1997 Term Leading-Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 162, 170-71
(1998).
208. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1125-26.
209. See id.
210. California has done so both through the legislature and case law. See CAL. PENALCODE § 1025
(West 1985 & Supp. 1999) ("[Tjhe question whether or not [a defendant] has suffered [a] prior
conviction shall be tried by the jury that tries the issue upon the plea of not guilty, or in the case of a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, by a jury impaneled for that purpose .... ") There are many
California court rulings. First, the prosecution must prove a prior conviction allegation beyond a
reasonable doubt. See People v. Tenner, 862 P.2d 840, 845 (1993); see also In re Yurko, 519 P.2d 561,
564 (1974). Second, the accused enjoys the privilege against self-incrimination. See id. at 564. Third,
the rules of evidence apply in such sentencing proceedings* See People v. Reed, 914 P.2d 184, 188
(1996); see also People v. Myers, 858 P.2d 301,306 (1993). Fourth, a defendant in such a proceeding
has the right to cross-examine witnesses. See Reed, 914 P.2d at 184 (quoting Specht v. Patterson, 386
U.S. at 610).
211. See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919) (holding that the imposition of the
death penalty on retrial of defendant previously sentenced to life in prison did not violate Double
Jeopardy Clause); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711,720 (1969), overruled by Alabama v. Smith,
490 U.S. 794 (1989) (holding the imposition of longer sentences on retrial to be in compliance with
Double Jeopardy Clause); Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 23-24 (1977) (emphasizing
inapplicability of Double Jeopardy Clause to sentence proceedings in which jury or judge imposes
sentence); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133 (1980) (stating that "[h]istorically, the
pronouncement of sentence has never carried the finality that attaches to an acquittal.").
212. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246,2247 (1998) (citing Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S.
430 (1981)). By creating procedural protections for prior conviction sentencings, California's
legislature and courts have carved a path for its three-strikes law to be a second exception. See The
Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 207. Butsee People v. Monge, 941 P.2dat 1126
(stating that "[s]o long as the state affords minimal due process of law, it need not provide all the
procedural guaranties that characterize a trial on guilt or innocence. Thus, a state that provides a trial
of sentencing allegations need not provide ajury trial. For the same reason, a state that provides a trial
of sentencing allegations arguably need not provide double jeopardy protection.") (citations omitted).
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sentencings that go above and beyond the "like a trial" test.213 Undoubtedly, the
protections under California law give the proceedings in question "'the hallmarks
of the trial on guilt or innocence."' 214 But are these traits sufficient to support the
adoption of a new exception?
B. The Constitution and California's Procedural Safeguards
In California, defendants accused of a prior conviction have a statutory right
to a jury trial.2" 5 The California Supreme Court has identified four additional
protections in the sentencing scheme in People v. Monge: the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard of proof of previous convictions,26 the privilege against self-
incrimination,217 the applicability of the rules of evidence,218 and the right to call
and confront witnesses.2"9 For each protection, the courts have made it expressly
clear that these safeguards are not matters of mere discretion, but are required by
the Constitution.22 °
In spite of the overwhelming evidence in support of a solid backbone of
constitutional law for prior-conviction sentencing proceedings protections, the
majority opinion stated the following:
Where noncapital sentencing proceedings contain trial-like protections, that is a
matter of legislative grace, not constitutional command. Many states have chosen
to implement procedural safeguards to protect defendants who may face dramatic
increases in their sentences as a result of recidivism enhancements. We do not
believe that because the States have done so, we are compelled to extend the double
jeopardy bar. Indeed, were we to apply double jeopardy here, we might create
213. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2249 (1998). Be it the great financial and emotional burden placed
on capital defendants, or the limitations of three-strike defendants' prior conviction proceedings to the
record of their prior conviction, there will always be differences between the two procedures. See
People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1121, 1129-30.
214. See 1997 Term-Leading Cases, supra note 207, at 164 n.29.
215. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (West 1985 & Supp. 1999).
216. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d 1121, 1126 (Cal. 1997) (citing Tenner, 862 P.2d at 845; In Re
Yurko, 519 P.2d 564).
217. See id. at 834 (citing Yurko, 519 P.2d at 565, n.5).
218. See id. it 1176 (citing Reed, 914 P.2d at 188; Meyers, 858 P.2d at 306).
219. See id. at 1124 (citing Reed, 914 P.2d at 191 n.6 (quoting Patterson, 386 U.S. at 610)).
220. See, e.g., Tenner, 862 P.2d at 845 ("Due process requires the prosecution to shouldertheburden
of proving each element of a sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt."). Perhaps an even
greater endorsement of the constitutional foundations of California's prior conviction allegation
sentencing restrictions is Yurko, which stands for the proposition that several important rights
guaranteed in the Constitution are also to be guaranteed in such proceedings. See Yurko, 519 P.2d at
564 ("Those procedures by which the imposition of such added penalties is to be fixed are thus
protected by specific constitutional provisions .... ).
disincentives that would diminish the important procedural protections.22" '
Should the Court create the exception advocated by this note, there is no support
for the contention that any type of safeguard purge would be held by the courts.
Previous Court decisions have separated these proceedings in such a way that
necessarily demands the protection of the Constitution.
The Double Jeopardy Clause has been held inapplicable to sentencing
proceedings because the defendant is not in jeopardy for an "offense. '222 Yet when
proceedings rise to a certain level, the Double Jeopardy Clause will apply. 223 Of
course, a proceeding must jump through certain hoops if it is to receive double
jeopardy protection. A mandate from the Constitution is just one. There are
others.
Justice O'Connor followed the lead of the California Supreme Court in reinforcing
the notion that Bullington created an exception to a general rule.224 In doing so, she
distinguished the proceedings in Monge on a number of levels in order to attenuate
the relationship between the sentencing proceedings and double jeopardy
protections.225  It is the nature of the proceedings that is at the heart of the
Bullington exception and the underlying Constitutional concerns. 226 However, the
application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to the consequences of capital, non-
capital, and three-strikes sentencing proceedings may provide a bit more trouble for
the judicial navigator.
221. Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. 2246, 2253 (1998).
222. See Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994).
223. See Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,445-46 (1981). The level a proceeding must rise to
has not always been fixed to the extreme nature of capital sentence proceedings. See Brian L. Summers,
Double Jeopardy: Rethinking the Parameters of the Multiplicity Prohibition, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 1595,
1604-05 (1995)
[T]he Court long ago concluded that the Double Jeopardy Clause applies to all criminal
offenses without regard to the particular form of punishment imposed. Moreover .... [the
Court held] that a government may not escape the dictates of the Fifth Amendment merely by
classifying a proceeding as civil in nature. A sanction imposed in what is nominally a civil
proceeding may constitute criminal punishment if it appears to be advancing the punitive goals
of retribution and deterrence.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
224. SeeMonge, 118 S. Ct. at 2247.
225. See id. at 2253 (comparing two distinct aspects of the proceedings that are in question-their
nature and their consequences).
226. See id. While the Court held the two aspects to be intertwined in capital proceedings, it did not
refute petitioner's contention that whether or not a proceeding is sufficiently like a trial is a matter of
nature and not consequence. The Court's analysis of Stroud focused not on the specific nature or
consequence of those proceedings, but on the fact that the capital sentencing procedures at that time
were significantly different than they are today. See id.
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C. The Consequences of the Court's Decision and its Impact on the Future
It is the unique nature of the death penalty that fuels Justice O'Connor's
refusal to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause to the case at bar.227 The majority
emphasized this uniqueness in a number of ways and based their view on a variety
of previous Supreme Court holdings including Bullington.28 The Court summa-
rized the unique nature of capital proceedings in that case by stating that:
[t]he underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American
system ofjurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not
be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense,
thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him
to live in a continuing state of anxiety and in security .... 229
Accordingly, the Court recognized the need for the utmost certainty and reliability
in proceedings involved with the death penalty. 30 In doing so, the majority
referenced Strickland v. Washington,23 ' Gardner v. Florida,232 and Lockett v.
Ohio233 for the general proposition that the penalty of death is qualitatively
different from any other sentence because it calls for a greater degree of reliability
when the death sentence is imposed."
In addition, Justice O'Connor referred to the landmark capital penalty case of
Gregg v. Georgia35 for the following holding: "Where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life
should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so
227. See, e.g., id. at 2252 ("Because the death penalty is unique 'in both its severity and its finality,'
we have recognized an acute need for reliability in capital sentencing proceedings.") (citation omitted).
228. See id. at 2252-53.
229. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430,445 (1981) (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S 184,
187 (1957)).
230. See Michael Milleman, Capital Post-Conviction Petitioners' Right to Counsel: Integrating
Access to Court Doctrine and Due Process Principles, 48 MD. L. REV. 455,478 (1989). The Supreme
Court has gone further to explain what constitutes "reliability." See Christopher K. Tahbaz, Note,
Fairness to the End: The Right to Confront Adverse Witnesses in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1345, 1362-63 (1989) (citing Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977)).
231. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
232. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
233. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
234. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
235. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. 236 In summary,
Justice O'Connor took the position that the death penalty, being the most extreme
of consequences, deserves the most extreme protections, and with such protections,
the Double Jeopardy Clause must attach.237
However, an argument could be made that the sentencing restrictions on
proceedings involving previous convictions in California are even more strict than
those in death penalty cases.238 Capital sentence proceedings provide an
opportunity for the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors, and even then
the trier of fact is given the opportunity to disregard any factual findings in refusing
to impose a stricter sentence.239 In contrast, in a proceeding like the one in Monge,
the sentencing jury is limited to evidence taken from the record of the prior
conviction, and can only impose a sentence enhancement if the allegations are
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.2" By establishing such leeway in capital
sentencing proceedings, the Court has added to the intangibles of emotional
distress for a defendant, producing a significant difference between the two types
of cases.24' In contrast, California's three-strikes proceedings have eliminated
many of these concerns.
The defendant, and any member of the public, can review [their] record before the
prior conviction trial and accurately forecast the trial's outcome. When a trial...
is short and readily predictable in this way, the defendant suffers correspondingly
less embarrassment, expense, and anxiety. Significantly, the defendant does not
236. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 189.
237. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
238. See generally People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1121, (highlighting the differences between
sentencing proceedings in cases involving the death penalty and California's three strikes law).
239. See id. at 1128. Often times such factors are improperly considered by a jury. See Joshua N.
Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating
Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGs L.J. 409 (1989). Even if such a factor is improperly
considered, often times it is not enough to overturn the imposition of a capital sentence. See Geraldine
A. McCafferty, et al., Eighteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court
and Courts of Appeals 1987-1988, 77 GEO. L.J. 1151, 1181-82 (1989).
240. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1129-30. An argument has been made that "the conservatives
on the Court are prepared to abandon the strict guidelines on capital sentencing proceedings described
above." See Steven G. Gey, Justice Scalia's Death Penalty, 20 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 67, 80 (1992).
241. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1129. For example, in capital cases, the sentence is in doubt
until the moment it is rendered. See supra notes 153-155. In comparison, a sentence enhancement
usually comes as no surprise to the defendant, as the only relevant information in such a proceeding is
his record of prior convictions. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1129. The unique nature of capital
sentencing and its attendant consequences on the defendant has been attributed to "the severity and
finality of the sentence of death." See George Wesley Sherrell, IV, Note, Successive Chances for Life:
Kuhlmann V. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus, and the Capital Petitioner, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 455,490
(1989). "This unique nature demands special procedural rules to ensure that each conviction and
sentence is meted out with a heightened degree of reliability." Id. at 490-91. Yet, the procedural
safeguards created to ensure reliability in capital sentencing may themselves cause additional hardships
on the defendant. See Alice McGill, Comment, Murray v. Giarratano: Right to Counsel in
Postconviction Proceedings in Death Penalty Cases, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 211, 216-18 (1990)
(outlining the protections required to ensure reliability in a capital sentence proceeding).
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need to sit for weeks or months while witnesses describe in detail to a jury and the
public the specifics of his alleged unlawful activities.
242
Judicial economy is well-served as a result of the Monge decision, which is
normally the case when bright line rules such as this one are developed.
243
Additionally, the legislative purpose attendant to the rash of recidivism statutes
enacted during the Clinton administration is well-served, because sentencing
proceedings are now heavily favored by the government. 2' However, the service
of these interests comes at a price. Justice O'Connor's holding is a far cry from the
sentiments of a nation that has rallied around the anthem, "Give me liberty or give
me death!" In essence, the majority has quantified certain freedoms. The Court's
decision implies that the anguish suffered by the capital defendant is inherently
greater than that of a man or woman who is looking down the barrel of a legal
shotgun that is capable of taking his or her freedom away for double the amount of
time, or even for his or her lifetime.
The most troubling legal ramifications of the Monge decision come in the
realm of evidentiary insufficiency. Double jeopardy strictly prohibits any type of
retrial when a prosecutor fails to meet his or her burden of proof.245 Justice Stevens
trumpeted this warning of negative impact in his dissent.246 He noted that the
Supreme Court has been quite clear in this area of the law and has gone so far as
to distinguish cases of evidentiary insufficiency from "legal errors that infect the
first proceeding."247 Most striking is the Court's holding in Schiro v. Farley,
25
which specifically extends the Double Jeopardy Clause's protections to cases of
evidentiary insufficiency in a sentencing proceeding.249 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor's decision has a significant impact. It not only dismisses the notion that
a lack of evidence will not bar a prosecutor from a "second bite at the apple," but
it also overturns Supreme Court precedent from only four years prior.
In moving from the legal arena to the political arena, Justices Souter and
242. See People v. Monge, 941 P.2d at 1129.
243. See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fightfor Civil Rights: The Supreme Court,
Congress, and Statutory Fees, 69 TEx. L. REV. 291,366 (1990) (analyzing judicial economy as a basis
for the Court's adoption of several bright line rules).
244. See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text.
245. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (prohibiting the prosecution from taking a
"second bite at the apple").
246. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. at 2253-55 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
247. See id. at 2254 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. 510U.S. 222(1994).
249. See id. at 231-32 ("The state is entitled to 'one fair opportunity' to prosecute a defendant....
and that opportunity extends not only to prosecution at the guilt phase, but also to present evidence at
an ensuing sentencing proceeding.").
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Scalia' s dissents posit very real threats to the Court's decision in Monge. Although
the Court makes determinations of previous convictions in separate proceedings,
it is the belief of Justices Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg that such determinations are
portions of the substantive offense.25° Justice Scalia warned that the Court's
opinion in Monge provides legislatures a loophole which may eradicate the Double
Jeopardy Clause completely.25" ' Justice Scalia's hypothetical scenario of a
jurisdiction permitting a single offense accompanied by multiple sentence
enhancements paints a dim picture of the protections afforded non-capital
defendants by Justice O'Connor and the majority.252 The current state of the law
has made it so that when buzzwords such as "three-strikes," "recidivism," and
"sentence enhancement" are introduced, the structure of constitutional case law is
thrown off base.253 The dissent gave an implied warning; the Court must take it
upon itself to ensure that legislative labeling is not the only thing standing in the
way of the nullification of the Double Jeopardy Clause. If it is, the rights of
defendants may already be lost.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fortunately for the due process rights of repeat offenders, the conclusion to
this issue still may come sometime in the future. As the Supreme Court demon-
strated in Bullington v. Missouri,54 courts may adopt exceptions to steadfast rules
if the law requires such extension of the law.255 Initially, the Court held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause was inapplicable to any sentencing proceeding. 6 Under
the Bullington exception, the Court created an exception for capital sentencing
procedures.257 In Monge v. California, the Court held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not apply to non-capital sentencing proceedings.5 The Court
reasoned that a delineation was necessary to resolve outstanding issues in double
jeopardy case law.259 Yet, the unresolved issues do not stop there. The strict
250. See Monge, 118 S. Ct. at 2255 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The fundamental distinction between
facts that are elements of a criminal offense and facts that go only to the sentence provides the
foundation for our entire Double Jeopardy jurisprudence .... I do not believe that distinction is...
simply a matter of the label affixed to each fact by the legislature.") (emphasis added).
251. See id. at 2255-57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia created a completely different Double
Jeopardy issue, arguing that the proceeding in question should not be considered sentencing at all, but
rather a separate portion of the proceedings concerning the substantive offense. See id. at 2255 (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
252. See id. at 2255-56 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that other Constitutional rights could be
dispensed with as well by simply making such protections a matter of the label affixed to the proceeding
by the legislature).
253. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. 451 U.S. 430 (1981).
255. See supra notes 212.
256. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
258. See Monge v. California, 118 S. Ct. at 2253.
259. See id. at 2250.
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guidelines of three-strikes laws pose new problems and even more double jeopardy
concerns. Hopefully, the Court will one day renew its efforts to traverse the
Sargasso Sea of double jeopardy law and create an additional exception for three-
strike proceedings.
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